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Abstract	
Recent	attacks	on	European	cities	and	the	ongoing	conflict	in	Syria	and	Iraq	are	prime	illustrations	of	
the	disruptive	influence	of	ISIS	on	the	region	and	the	world.	In	contemporary	literature	ISIS	is	
generally	described	as	a	rational	terrorist	organisation	with	political	and	territorial	goals.	However,	
upon	closer	inspection	there	are	actions	and	choices	made	by	ISIS	that	do	not	appear	to	be	rational.	
In	order	to	explain	these	irrational	actions	and	choices	in	a	rational	way,	this	thesis	uses	the	theory	of	
bounded	rationality.	According	to	bounded	rationality,	the	rational	decision-making	process	of	an	
actor	is	limited	by	its	environment	and	availability	of	alternatives.	The	apocalyptic	ideology	of	ISIS	
imposes	such	constraints	on	the	rationality	of	ISIS	that	this	thesis	examines	whether	irrational	
behaviour	of	ISIS	becomes	rational	when	taking	into	consideration	the	motivations	and	incentives	
provided	by	the	apocalyptic	ideology.	The	research	is	carried	out	by	an	interpretive	case	study	
analysis	examining	primary	and	secondary	sources	describing	the	actions	and	underlying	motivations	
for	ISIS.	An	analysis	of	the	available	sources	shows	that	seemingly	irrational	behaviour	of	ISIS	can	be	
explained	as	rational	when	considering	it	as	an	apocalyptic	cult	with	corresponding	motivations.	The	
eschatological	view	provided	ISIS	with	a	rationale	for	its	actions	and	strategic	choices.	This	research	
has	contributed	to	a	more	complete	understanding	of	ISIS	and	religiously	motivated	violence	in	
general.	
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Introduction	
By	 mid-October	 2014,	 the	 Islamic	 State	 of	 Iraq	 and	 Syria,	 henceforth	 referred	 to	 as	 ISIS,	
presumably	commanded	over	31.000	fighters	and	gained	control	over	a	considerable	territory	(Lister,	
2014,	16).	Tens	of	thousands	of	Muslims	are	thought	to	have	immigrated	to	support	the	struggle	of	
ISIS	and	to	live	in	the	caliphate.	Recruits	of	ISIS	are	coming	from	almost	every	nation	(Wood,	2015,	8).	
The	widespread	nature	of	the	caliphate	of	ISIS	and	its	adherers	across	the	globe		clearly	illustrate	that	
ISIS	has	extensive	influence	in	the	region	and	worldwide	(Gulmonhamad,	2014,	6-7).	
In	 contemporary	 literature	 ISIS	 is	 considered	 as	 a	 terrorist	 organisation,	 with	 political	 and	
territorial	 goals,	 which	 behaviour	 is	 understandable	 from	 a	 rational	 perspective.	 Gulmonhamad	
describes	the	rise	of	ISIS	and	its	strategic	choices,	in	which	he	goes	into	detail	regarding	its	financial	
situation	(2014,	2-3).	Due	to	strategic	choices,	ISIS	gained	control	over	oil	fields	and	accumulated	profit,	
together	with	illicit	trades	such	as	extortion,	blackmailing	and	black	market	antique	selling	which	made	
ISIS	a	wealthy	non-state	actor	that	managed	to	earn	approximately	2	million	dollars	per	day	in	2014.	
This	made	it	the	wealthiest	terrorist	organisation	in	the	world	(Lister,	2014,	2).	Hamid	argues	that	the	
behaviour	of	ISIS	is	rational	and	based	on	strategic	and	military	objectives.	By	instigating	a	conflict	that	
forced	Western	powers	to	take	action,	 ISIS	justifies	 its	struggle,	corresponding	actions	and	ideology	
that	 it	 is	 fighting	 against	 a	 greater	 evil	 (2015).	 Furthermore,	 attacks	 on	 European	 cities	 and	public	
execution	of	Westerners	could	be	part	of	a	more	elaborate	strategy;	forcing	the	US	and	other	Western	
countries	to	rely	to	a	greater	extent	on	autocratic	allies	such	as	Assad,	ISIS	undermines	their	credibility	
(Lister	et	al.,	2014).	When	considering	the	examples	above,	it	appears	that	ISIS	is	a	rational	actor.	
However,	there	are	aspects	of	ISIS’s	behaviour	that	cannot	be	explained	by	simple	rationality	
aimed	at	political	or	territorial	gains.	One	might	consider	the	attacks	on	European	cities	as	a	warning	
for	 ISIS’s	enemies	 to	no	 longer	engage	 in	warfare	against	 the	caliphate.	However,	 this	had	not	 the	
desired	effect;	France,	one	of	the	most	persistent	opponents	of	ISIS,	did	not	retreat	but	intensified	its	
military	 output.	 An	 explanation	 might	 be	 forcing	 the	West	 to	 go	 all	 in	 because	 it	 would	 provide	
confirmation	of	 ISIS’s	narrative	and	be	appealing	 to	potential	members,	 similar	 logic	 is	used	by	Al-
Qaeda.	The	difference	between	ISIS	and	Al-Qaeda	is	that	ISIS	is	located	at	an	identifiable	territory	as	a	
proto-state;	this	makes	it	more	vulnerable	for	western	retaliations	(Hamid,	2015).	For	comparison,	a	
small	state	with	little	military	strength	would	logically	not	attack	greater	military	powers	because	of	
fear	 of	 retaliations	 directed	 at	 their	 population	 or	 territory.	 However,	 ISIS	 is	 willing	 to	 accept	
retaliations	 for	 the	sake	of	 their	cause	(Roy,	2017,	52).	Beheadings	of	American	 journalists	had	the	
same	effect;	the	result	was	an	intensification	of	military	input	of	the	adversaries	of	ISIS	(Lister,	2014).	
Provoking	these	Western	powers	becomes	even	more	irrational	when	taking	into	account	the	fact	that	
MSc	Thesis	Hans	Frederik	Gille,	s1121510	
3	
	
the	West	did	not	considered	ISIS	as	a	major	problem.	Western	military	output	included	little	more	than	
precision	 bombardments	 (Roy,	 2017,	 89).	 This	 changed	 after	 ISIS	 attacked	 Europe	 and	 ISIS’s	
adversaries	became	committed	to	intensify	their	opposition	(Gartenstein-Ross,	2015).		
ISIS	allocates	a	significant	amount	of	resources	to	capture	the	specific	territory	of	Dabiq,	Syria.	
Although	this	small	village	near	the	border	with	Turkey	does	not	seem	to	be	of	any	military	importance	
ISIS	appears	to	be	very	eager	to	capture	this	specific	village.	This	is	especially	surprising	due	to	the	fact	
that	ISIS	expended	a	vast	amount	of	military	equipment	and	personnel	which	could	better	be	used	to	
capture	 strategically	more	 important	 territory.	This	 shows	 that	 ISIS	 is	motivated	by	something	else	
than	 political	 or	 strategical	 gains	 (McCants,	 2015,	 147).	 Furthermore,	 the	 recruitment	 of	 foreign	
fighters,	the	thriving	force	behind	ISIS,	has	been	declining	since	2015	(Hamid,	2015).	The	intensified	
military	output	of	Western	forces	and	the	declining	number	of	recruits	are	the	sole	effects	of	choices	
made	by	ISIS	(Gartenstein-Ross,	2015).		
Thus,	in	some	instances	the	behaviour	of	ISIS	is	difficult	to	explain	and	does	not	make	sense	
when	taking	an	outsider’s	perspective.	These	irrational	actions	might	be	explained	by	considering	them	
as	 miscalculations,	 bad	 strategic	 choices	 or	 religious	 symbolism,	 but	 this	 irrational	 behaviour	 is	
occurring	structurally.	Therefore,	an	explanation	that	relies	merely	on	the	fallacies	in	ISIS’s	behaviour	
or	 symbolism	 is	 not	 satisfying.	 When	 taking	 into	 consideration	 the	 fact	 that	 ISIS	 appears	 to	 be	
motivated	by	religion,	it	gives	way	for	a	more	complete	understanding	of	its	behaviour.	Last	decades,	
there	were	numerous	organisations,	motivated	by	religion,	which	appeared	to	be	irrational.	However,	
it	became	possible	to	rationalize	the	behaviour	of	these	so-called	‘apocalyptic	cults’	when	exploring	
their	motivations.	 Such	organisations	 include	Heaven’s	Gate	 (Stewart	and	Harding,	1999,	289),	 the	
People’s	 Temple	 and	 Aum	 Shinrikyo	 (Lifton,	 2008,	 303).	 Adherers	 of	 these	 organisations	 were	 so	
committed	to	a	higher	goal	that	they	were	even	willing	to	end	their	lives	to	achieve	this	goal	proclaimed	
by	their	ideology	(Trompf,	2013,	63).	This	thesis	researches	whether	ISIS’s	behaviour	can	be	explained	
when	taking	into	account	the	incentives	and	motivations	for	its	behaviour	from	the	perspective	of	an	
apocalyptic	cult.		
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ISIS:	rational	terrorist	organization?	
Terrorism	
In	order	to	provide	a	clear	understanding	of	the	contemporary	literature	describing	ISIS	as	a	
terrorist	organisation,	it	is	important	to	describe	what	the	concept	of	terrorism	entails.	To	what	extent	
does	 ISIS	 match	 with	 the	 characteristics	 of	 a	 terrorist	 organisation	 and	 by	 which	 events	 is	 this	
illustrated?	Ruby	(2002)	discussed	the	various	definitions	of	terrorism	and	came	to	the	conclusion	that	
it	 is	defined	via	the	presence	of	three	criteria.	First,	 terrorism	is	politically	motivated	and	meant	to	
influence	 governmental	 policy.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 directed	 at	 non-combatants	who	are	not	 able	 or	
prepared	to	defend	themselves	against	the	violent	attacks.	Ruby’s	third	criteria	is	the	notion	that	that	
terrorism	is	perpetrated	by	non-state	actors	(2002,	9-11).	Examples	of	such	non-state	actors	are	the	
IRA,	ETA	and	the	PLO	(Heywood,	2007,	283).	This	point	is	heavily	disputed	by	authors	that	argue	that	
states	are	also	capable	of	terrorism.	According	to	Westra,	states	are	just	as	capable	of	violating	human	
rights	by	targeting	civilians	for	political	gain	or	influencing	support	for	governmental	policy	(2012,	5-
12).	These	terrorist	acts	are	often	carried	out	during	armed	conflicts	as	acts	of	war.	Therefore,	they	are	
often	 not	 regarded	 as	 acts	 of	 terrorism.	 However,	 attacks	 carried	 out	 by	 states	 against	 non-
combatants,	e.g.	the	US	using	napalm	in	Vietnam	or	Russian	gulag	camps	(Balmforth,	2013),	should	be	
considered	as	terrorism	as	well.	This	notion	that	not	only	non-state	actors	are	capable	of	terrorism	is	
important	because	ISIS	transcended	beyond	the	level	of	a	non-state	actor	into	a	type	of	proto-state	
(Hamid,	2015).	
Thus,	 terrorism	 attempts	 to	 corrode	 the	 enemy’s	 willingness	 to	 engage	 into	 conflict	 by	
instigating	terror	among	indirect	victims.	When	used	by	non-state	actors,	it	is	often	considered	as	a	
weapon	of	the	weak	when	conventional	combat	is	not	a	feasible	option	in	order	to	win	the	conflict	
(Heywood,	2007,	284-285).	Perpetrators	regard	their	position	as	undesirable	because	of	their	lack	of	
bargaining	power.	They	try	to	improve	their	bargaining	position	in	the	conflict	by	decreasing	popular	
support	for	the	enemy’s	cause	(Lake,	2002,	17).	It	should	be	clear	that	states	use	terrorism	to	protect	
or	reinforce	the	existing	structure	while	non-state	actors	use	terrorism	to	alter	the	current	situation.	
Various	authors	agree	with	Ruby’s	description	that	terrorism	aims	to	influence	governmental	policy	
and	therefore	their	bargaining	position	by	targeting	non-combatants	with	attacks	(Ruby,	2002,	9-11).		
In	addition	to	Ruby’s	three	criteria,	Lake	(2002)	and	other	authors	argue	that	terrorism	can	be	
explained	by	regarding	terrorists	as	rational	and	sensible	actors.	Non-state	terrorists	try	to	improve	
their	political	position	with	without	engaging	in	direct	combat	and	resorting	to	low-cost	attacks	that	
do	some	damage	but	are	hard	to	prevent	by	the	target	population	or	state.	By	committing	to	terrorism,	
the	perpetrators	are	able	to	instigate	fear	without	exposing	themselves	on	the	battlefield	(Lake,	2002,	
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15).	For	state-sponsored	terrorists,	terrorism	may	be	a	rational	choice	when	it	presents	itself	as	the	
least	 costly	way	 to	 force	a	population	 into	 submission	without	experiencing	high	 costs	 (Nalbandov	
2013,	97).	Pape	argues	that	these	attacks	are	ways	to	instigate	mounting	civilian	costs,	either	material	
or	immaterial.	These	costs	need	to	rise	to	the	point	that	the	enemy	concedes	to	the	demands	of	the	
perpetrating	organisation	or	state	(2003,	346).	That	being	said,	it	should	be	clear	that	terrorism	and	
violence	are	a	means	for	terrorist	organisations	to	achieve	political	objectives	by	instigating	terror	on	
rational	considerations	(Lake,	2002,	18).	
	
ISIS	
In	 contemporary	 literature	 ISIS	 is	 often	 described	 as	 a	 terrorist	 organisation	 with	 political	
objectives.	According	to	Firestone,	Jihadism	and	ISIS	are	military	movements	rooted	in	political	Islam	
and	are	concerned	with	political	objectives	(2013,	263).	At	first	sight	ISIS	fulfils	the	criteria	discussed	
above	with	the	notion	that	ISIS	neither	a	non-state	actor	or	a	state	but	is	located	in	the	middle	of	this	
spectrum	like	a	kind	of	proto-state	(Hamid,	2015).	Lister	described	ISIS	as	an	actor	whose	behaviour	
and	the	corresponding	actions	are	rational	and	lead	to	its	current	position	as	one	of	the	most	influential	
actors	in	the	region	(2014,	30-36).	Its	vast	amount	in	numbers,	territory,	worldwide	support	and	the	
extraordinary	accumulation	of	capital	makes	it	a	risk	for	regional	stability.	Furthermore,	it	has	taken	
control	 of	 numerous	 oil	 fields	 from	which	 it	 exploits	 a	 significant	 profit	 to	meet	 their	 demand	 for	
military	assets	 (Gulmonhamad,	2014,	2).	 These	military	assets	are	 increasingly	obtained	across	 the	
border,	and	some	even	say	from	states	supporting	ISIS	such	as	Saudi-Arabia.	In	general,	the	economic	
strategy	of	ISIS	seems	to	be	very	aggressive	but	rational	nonetheless	(Lister,	2014,	14-15).	
ISIS’s	approach	towards	new	recruits	is	very	professionalized	as	well.	ISIS	spends	a	significant	
amount	of	time	and	energy	 in	military	and	religious	training	professionalizing	new	recruits.	Military	
training	focusses	on	the	use	of	weaponry	while	during	the	religious	training,	personal	information	and	
believes	 of	 new	 recruits	 are	 collected.	 After	 several	 weeks	 of	 extensive	 training,	 new	 recruits	 are	
assigned	 to	guard	duty	before	being	sent	off	 to	 frontline	operations	 (Lister,	2014,	17-18).	 ISIS	uses	
structured	internal	methods	to	reinforce	the	unity	within	the	organisation	and	assures	new	recruits	
support	the	cause.	According	to	Williams,	the	determination	of	ISIS	to	preserve	the	caliphate	and	the	
military	strategy	makes	it	an	actor	whose	behaviour	is	rational;	an	irrational	actor	would	not	be	able	
to	withstand	this	determined	opposition	for	this	period	of	time.	This	is	 impressive	when	taking	into	
consideration	the	fact	that	ISIS’s	adversaries	possess	significantly	more	assets	than	their	rival	(2015).	
Recent	terrorist	attacks	in	Brussels,	Nice	and	Paris	make	clear	that	the	violent	nature	and	ISIS’s	
actions	do	not	limit	itself	to	the	region.	According	to	Wood	(2015,	17),	atrocities	committed	by	ISIS	are	
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aimed	 to	 hasten	 the	 conflict	 and	 avoid	 prolonged	 conflict.	 Perpetrating	 terrorist	 attacks	 to	 scare	
opponents	from	continuing	their	fight	against	ISIS	makes	sense.	These	attacks	can	be	seen	as	prime	
examples	of	rational	means	of	scaremongering	by	ISIS	towards	its	opponents	(Sungtaek	and	Seokjoo,	
2016,	21-25).	These	attacks	can	be	seen	in	line	with	the	second	criteria	of	Ruby	due	to	the	fact	ISIS	
targets	civilians	in	order	to	force	their	opponents	to	stop	fighting	ISIS	(Roy,	2017,	1).	The	recent	attack	
on	youngsters	at	the	concert	in	Manchester	is	another	example	of	this	gruesome	tactic	(Gartenstein-
Ross,	2017).	If	the	attacks	of	ISIS	lead	to	diminishing	support	in	the	western	countries	for	the	conflict	
in	 Syria,	 scaremongering	 would	 be	 a	 viable	 explanation	 for	 ISIS’s	 actions	 and	 made	 it	 logical	 to	
understand	their	motives	(Lake,	2002,	19).		
However,	a	decrease	of	support	for	the	war	in	the	targeted	countries	was	not	the	case	(Hamid,	
2015).	Despite	Western	retaliations,	which	for	a	rational	actor	does	not	seem	the	desired	response,	
ISIS	 has	 continued	 to	 attack	 the	 population	 of	 its	 adversaries	 (Roy,	 2017,	 81).	 At	 first	 sight	 the	
behaviour	of	ISIS	seems	to	make	sense	and	to	be	logical	from	an	outside	perspective	but	upon	closer	
inspection	it	appears	that	there	are	parts	of	ISIS’s	behaviour	that	cannot	be	explained	when	taking	a	
rational	outside	perspective	and	regarding	it	as	terrorism.	ISIS	appears	to	make	irrational	decisions	and	
also	engages	in	direct	combat	with	the	opposing	military	forces	besides	their	attacks	on	civilians	(Lister,	
2014,	1).	This	engagement	into	direct	combat	is	not	characterizing	for	terrorist	organisations	(Ruby,	
2002,	10).	Therefore,	this	thesis	will	take	into	consideration	the	motives	and	incentives	of	ISIS	for	a	
deeper	understanding	of	the	organisation	and	its	behaviour	which	appears	to	be	irrational	and	not	in	
line	with	the	provided	definition	of	terrorism.	
	
Theoretical	framework	
The	 section	 above	 elaborated	 on	 contemporary	 literature	 that	 classified	 ISIS	 as	 a	 rational	
terrorist	 organisation.	 However,	 the	 previous	 section	 concluded	with	 the	 notion	 that	 not	 all	 ISIS’s	
actions	can	be	explained	by	 rationality	or	 the	definition	of	 terrorism.	 In	order	 to	explain	actions	of	
actors	which	appears	not	to	be	rational,	authors	have	tried	to	include	the	internal	logic	of	such	actors	
in	their	analysis.		By	doing	this,	rationality	can	be	found	in	behaviour	that	prior	seemed	to	be	irrational.	
Caplan	 states	 that	 the	 terrorist	 acts	 of	 organisations	 such	 as	 ISIS	 cannot	 be	 explained	 by	
applying	simple	rationality.	He	argues	that	seemingly	irrational	behaviour	of	actors	can	be	considered	
as	rational	when	taking	into	account	the	incentives	and	justifications	provided	by	the	internal	logical	
of	 such	organisations.	Regarding	 terrorist	organisations,	 such	 rationalizing	 incentives	 can	 take	 very	
simple	 forms;	 e.g.	 Al-Qaeda	 offered	 the	 families	 of	 suicide	 bombers	 financial	 compensation	 and	
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protection	to	persuade	members	to	perform	terrorist	attacks.	This	is	a	very	simple	or	basic	incentive,	
but	 these	motivations	 can	be	more	abstract	 as	well;	 the	 ideology	of	 a	 terrorist	organisation	might	
provide	 affiliates	 with	 a	 different	 rationale	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 taken	 into	 consideration	 because	 it	
motivates	them	to	act	 in	a	certain	way	(2005,	96).	Wiktorowicz	and	Kaltenthaler	agree	with	Caplan	
that	 the	 behaviour	 of	 terrorist	 organisations	 becomes	 rational	 when	 considering	 their	 ideological	
justifications	and	incentives	(2016,	447).	Thus,	there	is	a	need	to	look	into	the	internal	processes	of	
ISIS	and	more	specifically	the	Islamist	eschatology	profoundly	present	in	the	ideology	to	understand	it	
to	further	extent	and	to	formulate	explanations	for	its	seemingly	irrational	behaviour.	
	
Bounded	rationality	
A	 theory	 that	 takes	 into	 consideration	 the	 limited	 information,	 limited	 alternatives	 and	
ideological	 justifications,	and	therefore	 is	able	to	explain	behaviour	to	a	 further	extent,	 is	bounded	
rationality.	Herbert	A.	Simon	laid	the	foundation	for	the	theory	of	bonded	rationality	as	early	as	1957.	
According	to	Simon,	the	decision-making	process	that	people	go	through	is	not	merely	rational	but	a	
search	 process	 guided	 by	 aspiration	 levels	 and	 availability	 of	 alternatives.	 No	 all	 alternatives	 are	
provided	or	available,	thus	the	actor	needs	to	find	available	options	by	investing	time	and	effort.	Full	
rational	decision	making	implies	that	people	would	possess	full	cognitive	capabilities,	full	knowledge	
and	enough	time	to	consider	the	available	alternatives	to	come	to	the	optimal	conclusion.	However,	
these	requirements	for	optimal	rational	decision	making	are	nearly	unattainable	in	practice	(Selten,	
2002,	14-15).	Thus,	when	trying	to	explain	behaviour	of	a	complex	actor	such	as	ISIS,	it	is	necessary	to	
take	into	consideration	the	bounded	rationality	imposed	on	such	an	actor.	
According	to	bounded	rationality	(Selten,	2002),	the	degree	to	which	an	actor	can	make	logical	
decisions	 is	 limited	 by	 various	 factors	 that	 heavily	 influence	 their	 decisions.	 Bounded	 rationality	
describes	 that	 these	 decisions	 are	 influenced	 by	 cognitive	 bounds,	 emotions,	 automated	 routine,	
available	 information,	 time-pressure	 and	 availability	 of	 alternatives.	 These	 aspects	 cause	 so-called	
satisficing	 behaviour	 in	which	 people	 tend	 to	 choose	 for	 the	 first	 option	 they	 come	 across	 that	 is	
satisfactory	instead	of	looking	for	the	optimal	solution.	When	an	idea	is	adapted	or	a	choice	is	made,	
people	remain	convinced	that	it	is	the	best	one.	Furthermore,	they	adapt	the	believe	that	anyone	who	
thinks	otherwise	is	wrong.	Due	to	this	satisficing	behaviour,	ideas,	ideology	and	therefore	the	choices	
made	by	people	are	heavily	influenced	by	their	surrounding	and	in	some	cases	education.	It	has	to	be	
emphasized	that	people	are	in	fact	able	to	change	their	perception	of	the	best	choice.	Due	to	aging,	
changing	 environments	 and	new	 relations,	 original	 satisficing	 behaviour	 or	 choices	 can	be	 altered.		
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Thus,	 in	 this	 thesis	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 actors	make	 rational	 decisions	 but	 their	 choices	 are	 in	 fact	
influenced	by	various	variables	in	their	surrounding	(Selten,	2002,	14-16).	
McKay	and	Dennett	argue	that	ideologies	create	systematic	misbeliefs	that	heavily	guide	the	
decisions	made	by	individuals	and	groups.	Scriptures	provided	by	ideology	together	with	norms	and	
values	 create	 a	 framework	 leading	 to	 ‘falsified’	 or	 seemingly	 irrational	 logic	 (2009,	 536-537).	 The	
concept	of	social	surrounding	is	defined	as	the	environment,	norms,	ideology	and	forced	commitment	
to	the	beliefs	of	the	actor.	The	environment	of	a	person	entails	its	birthplace,	education,	intelligence	
and	social	relations.	In	this	social	environment,	ideology	might	have	an	influential	role.	In	this	thesis,	
the	concept	of	ideology	entails	the	foundation	on	which	its	followers	make	decisions	and	judge	other’s	
behaviour	(Tylor	and	Frazer,	2006,	24-25).	This	includes	religion	and	norms	advocated	by	ideology,	and	
social	pressure	of	conforming	to	these	norms	by	their	social	surrounding.	It	should	be	emphasized	that	
bounded	rationality	is	not	a	competitor	of	rationality	but	a	more	developed	and	realistic	explanation	
of	behaviour	by	providing,	for	the	ingroup,	rational	explanations	(Selten,	2002,	15).	The	term	outsider’s	
perspective	 is	used	 to	describe	a	neutral	view	not	 influenced	by	 limitations	 imposed	by	a	bounded	
rationale.	
Thus,	bounded	rationality	explains	how	seemingly	irrational	behaviour	becomes	logical	when	
taking	into	consideration	the	 limitations	 imposed	on	the	possible	rationality.	Discussed	below	is	the	
research	question,	the	hypothesis/argument	and	how	this	research	will	be	carried	out.	
	
Research	question	
The	question	that	guides	this	analysis	of	ISIS	is:	to	which	extent	can	bounded	rationality,	entailed	by	
the	narrative	of	an	apocalyptic	cult,	be	used	to	explain	the	irrational	actions	of	ISIS?	
	
Hypothesis	
	 Bounded	rationality	will	be	applied	to	ISIS	in	order	to	understand	its	behaviour	and	the	choices	
it	has	made.	Besides	as	a	terrorist	organisation	there	is	another	way	to	look	at	ISIS	and	this	is	to	look	
at	it	as	an	apocalyptic	cult.	Bounded	rationality	will	be	applied	to	ISIS	by	considering	it	as	an	apocalyptic	
cult.	This	means	that	in	this	thesis,	motivations	and	characteristics	of	apocalyptic	cults	will	be	used	to	
explain	the	behaviour	of	ISIS	as	rational	but	limited	by	bounded	rationality.	This	perspective	provides	
a	 viable	explanation	when	 including	 the	necessity	 to	 take	 into	account	 ideological	 justification	and	
incentives	of	organisations.		
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ISIS’s	global	Jihad	(McCants,	2015,	103)	seems	to	be	founded	on	the	idea	dating	back	to	the	8th	
century	that	a	final	battle	between	the	true	Muslims	and	the	nonbelievers	will	take	place.	This	idea	
comes	forth	from	the	Hadith,	the	leading	scriptures	for	ISIS	written	after	the	death	of	Mohammed,	and	
is	considered	as	leading	by	the	militant	organisation	(Dabiq	issue	1,	2015,	4).	This	idea	of	an	apocalypse	
motivates	adherers	of	ISIS	to	engage	in	combat	and	that	these	true	Muslims	will	be	saved	when	they	
conquer	the	Syrian	city	of	Dabiq	(Roy,	2017,	56).	Due	to	the	influence	of	eschatology,	the	hypothesis	
of	 this	 thesis	 is:	By	 looking	at	 ISIS	as	an	apocalyptic	 cult,	 bounded	 rationality	makes	 it	 possible	 for	
rationality	to	be	found	in	behaviour	that	prior	seemed	irrational.	
Lifton	 (2000)	 constructed	 a	 framework	 for	 behaviour	 of	 apocalyptic	 cults	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
research	on	the	Japanese	apocalyptic	cult	Aum	Shinrikyo	which	committed	several	terrorist	attacks.	
Lifton	 defines	 apocalyptic	 cults	 as	 organisations	 envisioning	 that	 the	 world	 will	 be	 destroyed	 or	
renewed	 dramatically.	 Adherers	 of	 an	 apocalyptic	 cult	 are	 often	 completely	 emerged	 in	 the	
organisation	and	are	exposed	to	a	totalitarian	control.	This	ideology	of	an	apocalypse	is	used	by	leaders	
of	the	cult	for	aggressive	indoctrination	of	followers	and	as	justification	for	the	use	of	violence	(2000,	
202-207).	 Lifton	 formulated	 twelve	 characteristics	 by	 which	 behaviour	 of	 apocalyptic	 cults	 can	 be	
explained.	Seven	of	these	apply	to	internal	logic	of	cults:	megalomaniac	and	totalitarian	leadership,	a	
vision	that	the	world	will	endure	an	apocalypse,	justification	for	killing	by	seeing	it	as	a	means	to	heal,	
need	for	purification	of	physical	existence,	use	of	heavy	weaponry,	shared	state	of	aggressive	numbing	
and	extreme	manipulation	with	a	claim	to	absolute	truth	(Lifton,	2000,	202-207).	The	five	remaining	
psychological	characteristics	are	used	by	La	Palm	regarding	 ISIS.	These	are:	milieu	control,	mystical	
manipulation,	 demand	 for	 purity,	 forced	 confession,	 dispensing	 of	 existence	 (2014,	 1-7).	 These	
characteristics	 shall	 be	 used	 as	 the	 definition	 of	 apocalyptic	 cults.	 Arguments	 of	 other	 authors	
regarding	ISIS	are	linked	to	these	characteristics	for	means	of	illustration	and	clarification.	
	
Argument	1:	Islamist	eschatology	explaining	irrational	resource	allocation	
The	 first	 and	 perhaps	 most	 substantial	 argument	 in	 favour	 when	 considering	 ISIS	 as	 an	
apocalyptic	cult,	is	its	emphasis	on	a	grand	renewal	or	transformation	of	the	world.	This	apocalyptic	
vision	 of	 the	world	 coming	 to	 an	 end	 is	 certainly	 not	 at	 new	 phenomena.	 This	 idea	 is	 one	 of	 the	
strongest	motivations	 for	 apocalyptic	 cults	 to	 act	 in	 the	way	 they	 do.	 (Lifton,	 2000,	 202).	 Islamist	
eschatology	 is	 described	 in	 the	 Qur’an	 but	 this	 would	 mean	 every	 Muslim	 would	 believe	 in	 the	
apocalypse	what	certainly	 is	not	the	case	 (Qur’an	2:8-10	and	31:31-35).	However,	 it	 is	described	 in	
more	detail	in	the	Hadith.	Therefore,	ISIS	has	expended	large	amounts	of	time,	money,	weapons	and	
personnel	order	to	capture	the	small	town	of	Dabiq	(McCants,	2015,	23).	Although	it	seems	irrational	
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to	 expend	 such	 amounts	 of	 resources	 in	 order	 to	 capture	 this	 village	 it	 becomes	 logical	 when	
considering	that	ISIS’s	rationality	is	influenced	by	the	belief	in	the	ideology	that	this	town	is	important	
for	the	forthcoming	apocalypse.		
This	argument	is	operationalised	by	looking	at	resource	allocation	decided	upon	by	ISIS	and	
underlying	motivations.	 This	 includes	 why	 ISIS	 decides	 to	 allocate	 resources	 for	 specific	 territorial	
assets	or	uses	weapons	to	inflict	harm	onto	specific	casualties	while	these	actions	are	not	logical	from	
an	outsider’s	perspective.	
	
Argument	2:	Prerogative	determining	who	are	saved	rationalizes	its	military	strategy	
ISIS’s	ideology	provides	a	prerogative	to	determine	who	are	saved	and	who	are	not.	This	aspect	
of	a	black	and	white	world	is	a	fundamental	characteristic	among	apocalyptic	cults	(Lister	et	al.,	2014).	
In	practice,	this	means	that	outsiders	should	either	be	converted	or	killed.	Especially	the	executions	of	
American	journalists	and	the	burning	of	a	Jordan	fighter	pilot	are	illustrative	events	of	this	prerogative	
that	 only	 intensified	 the	 opposition	 to	 ISIS	 (Hamid,	 2015).	 After	 this	 became	 public,	 the	 Jordan	
government	vowed	to	intensify	the	fight	against	ISIS	as	a	means	of	blood	vengeance	(Su,	2015).	These	
actions	are	in	line	with	Lifton’s	characteristic	that	apocalyptic	cults	want	to	purify	the	world	which	at	
the	same	time	functions	as	a	means	of	justification	for	the	use	of	force	(2000,	267	&	27).	Provoking	
adversaries	of	ISIS	to	intensify	their	fight	against	the	caliphate	seems	irrational	but	these	acts	and	the	
retaliations	are	used	as	a	confirmation	that	ISIS’s	cause	is	just	(Claridge,	1999,	138).	Furthermore,	ISIS	
refuses	to	cooperate	with	similar	organisations.	By	refusing	to	cooperate,	ISIS	neglects	the	possibility	
of	allies	and	choses	to	have	more	adversaries.	The	adherers	of	ISIS	are	so	committed	to	their	ideology	
that	they	reject	all	alterative	truths	followed	by	infidels.	Therefore,	ISIS	believes	that	it	goes	against	
their	 ideology	to	cooperate	with	those	who	not	believe	in	the	right	form	of	Islam	which	makes	this	
choice	understandable.		
Operationalization	of	this	argument	is	done	under	the	term	of	military	strategy.	This	covers	
strategic	 choices	 ISIS	 has	 made	 regarding	 the	 use	 of	 force	 against	 its	 opponents	 or	 infidels.	 This	
includes	the	attacks	on	European	cities,	the	battle	for	the	caliphate,	possible	cooperation	with	other	
actors	in	the	region	and	the	brutal	public	executions	of	captured	enemies.	
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Argument	 3:	 ISIS’s	 ideology	 of	 being	 saved,	 even	 upon	 death,	 rationalizes	 its	 disposal	 of	 worldly	
existence	
Lack	of	self-preservation	of	ISIS	fighters	during	combat	has	been	reported	numerous	times.	It	
appears	 that	 ISIS’s	 fighters	do	not	 fear	death	during	combat	situations	or	 terrorist	attacks.	Besides	
their	willingness	to	cause	casualties	among	unharmed	civilians	and	military	forces,	they	appear	to	be	
eager	 to	 die	 for	 their	 cause	 (Roy,	 2017,	 56).	 These	 acts,	 which	 appear	 to	 go	 against	 any	 idea	 of	
rationality	can	be	explained	when	looking	into	the	beliefs	of	ISIS.	According	to	them,	death	does	not	
mean	defeat,	it	is	considered	as	a	victory	and	being	saved	(La	Palm,	2014,	7).	The	idea	of	being	saved	
upon	death	functions	as	a	significant	motivation	to	fight	or	even	die	for	the	cause	of	ISIS	(Barron	and	
Maye,	2017).		
This	shall	be	operationalized	via	combat	behaviour	and	entails	the	behaviour	of	ISIS’s	fighters	
during	armed	combat.	This	includes	tactics,	behaviour	towards	opponents	and	specifically	the	lack	of	
self-preservation	shown	during	these	battles.	
	
Argument	 4:	 Milieu	 control	 and	 internal	 purity	 advocated	 by	 ISIS	 is	 rational	 when	 including	 their	
commitment	to	their	cause	
ISIS	uses	the	claim	to	an	absolute	truth	to	exert	their	control	deeply	into	the	personal	life	of	
adherers	including	their	relations	to	one	another	and	activities	(La	Palm,	2014,	2).	Communication	both	
inside	and	outside	is	strictly	monitored	with	harsh	punishments	when	rules	are	violated.	Threat,	force,	
coercion,	abduction	or	deception	is	used	when	they	do	not	comply	to	the	set	rules	(Binetti,	2015,	3).	A	
strict	 internal	 control	 appears	 rational	 from	 an	 outsider’s	 perspective	 but	 the	 live	 broadcasted	
executions	and	punishment	of	affiliates	of	ISIS	does	certainly	not	increase	the	willingness	of	foreigners	
to	travel	to	the	caliphate	by	which	ISIS	 inflicts	damage	upon	itself.	However,	 ISIS	strives	to	keep	its	
followers	a	pure	as	possible.	Any	impurity	will	corrupt	its	cause	and	therefore	be	an	insult	to	the	holy	
scriptures	of	Mohammed	and	the	Hadith.	(Warner,	2010,	15).	The	pressure	exerted	by	the	adherers	of	
ISIS	towards	their	fellow	believers	creates	an	environmental	confirmation	of	their	rationale.	
	Management	of	membership	(Human	resources	management	of	ISIS)	entails	the	strategy	used	
by	ISIS	regarding	the	relation	between	the	leaders	of	the	organisation	and	the	affiliates.	This	includes	
the	 internal	 construction	 of	 ISIS,	 the	 enforcement	 of	 ideology,	 punishment,	 forced	 confession,	
communication,	recruitment	of	potential	new	fighters	and	the	education	aimed	at	the	persuasion	and	
indoctrination	of	new	recruits.	
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Methodology:	
The	 research	 consists	 of	 a	 hermeneutic	 case	 study	 analysis	 of	 ISIS	 and	 its	 behaviour.	 The	
different	forms	of	hermeneutic	research	are	guided	by	interpretation	of	texts	and	events	in	order	to	
provide	explanations	for	the	subject	of	study.	From	the	several	forms	of	hermeneutics,	this	research	
uses	conventional	hermeneutics	(Babb,	2012,	364-365).	Conventional	hermeneutics	focusses	on	four	
elements;	authorial	intention,	nature	or	genre	of	the	text,	context	and	the	role	of	the	‘reader’.	These	
elements	 seem	 to	 imply	 that	 hermeneutics	 only	 focusses	 on	 texts,	 however,	 in	 conventional	
hermeneutics	occurred	events	are	also	considered	among	the	available	evidence.	For	a	more	complete	
understanding	of	 ISIS	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 take	 all	 available	 evidence	 into	 consideration	 including	 the	
context	 and	meaning	 of	 texts	 and	 actions	 (Taylor	 et	 al.,	 2016,	 162).	 Therefore,	 for	means	 of	 data	
collection,	both	primary	and	secondary	sources	shall	be	consulted.	The	primary	sources	will	consist	of	
the	 holy	 Qur’an	 and	 translated	 documents	 of	 ISIS	 such	 as	 the	 Hadith	 and	 ISIS’s	 magazine	Dabiq,	
renamed	to	Rumiyah	after	ISIS	lost	control	of	Dabiq.	Secondary	literature	consists	of	academic	articles,	
books	and	published	news	articles	on	ISIS.	Thus,	this	thesis	makes	use	of	historical	sources	and	present-
day	events.	This	is	done	by	using	the	theory	of	bounded	rationality	(Selten,	2000)	the	four	arguments,	
Lifton’s	characteristics	(2000,	2000-2009)	and	a	study	of	existing	literature.	Empirical	evidence	shall	be	
examined	via	the	four	arguments	and	subsequently	assessed	on	the	basis	of	the	hypothesis,	research	
question	whether	ISIS	can	be	understood	to	a	further	extent	when	considered	as	an	apocalyptic	cult	
whereby	its	rationality	is	bounded	by	this	narrative.	
	
Limitations	
Limited	access	to	primary	sources	can	be	seen	as	one	of	the	limitations	of	this	research.	Due	
to	the	fact	that	the	writer	of	this	thesis	is	not	able	to	read	the	original	texts	in	Arabic,	translations	will	
be	regarded	as	primary	sources	in	this	thesis	which	might	lead	to	misinterpretations.	Therefore,	any	
assumptions	 or	 conclusions	made	 in	 this	 thesis	might	 be	 contradicted	 by	 sources	which	were	 not	
translated,	available	or	accessible	during	the	writing	of	this	thesis.	
	
Analysis	of	the	four	arguments	
	 The	section	below	will	consist	of	the	analysis	of	the	four	arguments	mentioned	above.	Each	
argument	will	be	constructed	of	examples	of	irrational	behaviour	of	ISIS	and	how	bounded	rationality,	
with	the	narrative	of	an	apocalyptic	cult,	is	able	to	rationalize	that	behaviour.	Rationalizing	of	irrational	
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behaviour	in	line	with	bounded	rationality	shall	be	done	on	the	basis	previously	discussed	primary	and	
secondary	 literature.	 It	 should	 be	 clear	 that	 the	 four	 arguments	 elaborated	 on	 below,	 are	 heavily	
connected	 because	 they	 are	 all	 derived	 from	 the	 narrative	 of	 an	 apocalyptic	 cult	 as	 explained	 by	
bounded	rationality.	
	
The	role	of	Islamist	eschatology	in	the	ideology	of	ISIS	and	its	corresponding	resource	allocation	
	 Allocation	of	resources	by	ISIS	comes	forth	from	one	of	the	foundations	of	 its	 ideology;	the	
idea	of	an	apocalypse	(McCants,	2015,	23).	In	the	Qur’an,	there	are	small	sections	that	hint	that	an	
apocalypse	is	part	of	the	Muslim	ideology	and	therefore	cannot	be	used	to	defend	this	claim	(Qur’an	
2:8-10	and	31:31-35).	However,	in	the	Hadith,	there	are	concrete	indications	that	the	world	is	at	the	
brink	of	an	apocalypse.	In	fact,	even	the	exact	location	and	the	catalyst	that	will	start	this	apocalypse	
are	described	in	these	additional	scriptures	(Sunnah,	book	54,	Hadith	44)	
Since	2015,	this	idea	has	taken	a	prominent	place	in	the	ideology	of	ISIS	motivating	them	to	
wage	war	with	the	West	for	the	final	battle	between	the	“Romans”	and	the	true	Muslims	(Roy,	2017,	
54).	The	terminology	of	“Romans”	can	in	this	context	be	interpreted	as	the	Western	world	based	on	
Christian	norms	and	values.	The	stage	of	this	forthcoming	apocalypse	is	located	in	Northern	Syria	near	
the	border	with	Turkey	at	the	small	town	of	Dabiq	(Hamid,	2015).	Apart	from	the	prophecies	foretold	
in	the	Hadith	about	this	grand	renewal	of	the	world	(Sunnah,	book	54,	Hadith	44),	there	is	no	rational	
explanation	for	ISIS	to	invest	significant	amounts	of	resources	in	order	to	capture	this	village.	Control	
over	 the	 town	 of	 Dabiq	 does	 not	 involve	 strategic,	 military	 or	 financial	 advantages	 over	Western	
powers	that	currently	control	the	town	(Hamid,	205).	According	to	the	Hadith	the	grand	battle	will	take	
place	when	 the	 “Romans”	 have	 landed	 at	 this	 specified	 territory	 and	 confront	 ISIS	 with	 full	 force	
(Wood,	2015,	5).	Thus,	for	adherers	of	the	prophecy	it	is	of	great	importance	they	are	waiting	for	the	
“Romans”	at	Dabiq	and	are	 therefore	willing	 to	engage	 in	 seemingly	 irrational	behaviour	 to	do	 so.	
Despite	of	the	great	amount	of	resources	expended	battling	over	this	territory,	for	ISIS	the	control	over	
Dabiq	will	be	considered	a	major	victory	 in	their	fight	and	fulfilling	 its	destiny	as	portrayed	by	their	
ideology	(Roy,	2017,	54).	
Expansionist	urges	can	be	seen	as	another	aspect	of	ISIS’s	behaviour	that	does	not	make	sense	
from	an	outsiders’	perspective.	Why	would	ISIS	invest	such	great	amounts	of	resources	to	engage	into	
an	 all-out	 conflict	with	 its	 adversaries	while	 investing	 in	 the	established	 territory	of	 the	 caliphate?	
Taking	 the	 scriptures	 of	 the	 forthcoming	 apocalypse	 into	 consideration	 it	 appears	 that	 the	
establishment	of	the	Islamist	caliphate	is	not	the	objective	for	ISIS	(McCants,	2015,	102-105).	It	appears	
to	be	a	means	to	achieve	something	greater	than	creating	a	state.	Connected	to	the	 idea	of	a	final	
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great	 battle	 between	 “Romans”	 and	Muslims	 is	 this	 seemingly	 irrational	 perception	 of	 war	 in	 the	
ideology	of	ISIS	and	its	corresponding	allocation	of	resources.	“The	state	preceding	the	apocalypse	is	
indeed	a	state	of	war,	not	of	peace	and	justice,	and	so	the	very	essence	of	ISIS	is	to	be	at	war”	(Roy,	
2017,	 55).	When	 assuming	 the	 rationale	 of	 ISIS	 is	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 forthcoming	
apocalypse	this	starts	to	make	sense.	Why	would	ISIS	invest	time,	resources	and	effort	in	conquering	
additional	territory	while	maintaining	what	they	already	control	is	already	a	challenge?	These	strategic	
choices	caused	ISIS	to	suffer	significant	losses	regarding	oil	exploitation	and	refining	(ICCT,	2016,	66).	
It	appears	that	ISIS	prefers	engaging	in	conflict	with	the	West	over	imposing	security	on	territory	they	
already	control	(Hamid,	2015).	The	rational	explanation	can	be	found	in	the	objective	they	try	to	fulfil;	
engaging	in	war	with	the	West,	or	in	their	words	”the	one-eyed	Deceiver”.	Defeating	the	“Romans”	is	
not	 the	objective,	 the	war	 is	 a	means	 to	 instigate	 the	 forthcoming	apocalypse	 leading	 to	 salvation	
(McCants,	2015,	106).		
The	continuous	fight	of	ISIS	in	order	to	instigate	the	apocalypse	weighs	heavier	than	preserving	
the	established	caliphate	which	already	starts	to	crumble	under	the	pressure	of	the	adversaries	of	ISIS.	
There	are	many	signs	that	display	the	weakness	of	ISIS	on	the	ground	where	it	used	to	be	one	of	the	
most	powerful	actors	in	the	region.	A	position	they	have	given	away	for	the	sake	of	their	fight	against	
the	“Romans”	 (Gulmonhamad,	2014,	7).	This	seemingly	 irrational	choice	of	 ISIS	 to	 invest	 in	conflict	
rather	 than	 state-building	 is	 a	prime	example	of	 ISIS’s	behaviour	 that	 could	only	be	understood	as	
rational	when	taking	into	consideration	its	motivations.	
	
Prerogative	to	determine	who	are	saved	and	military	strategy	
	 A	profound	characteristic	of	ISIS	is	its	lack	of	willingness	to	compromise	or	negotiate	with	its	
adversaries	or	other	 communities	 in	 the	 region.	 ISIS	 continues	 to	have	no	 respect	 for	 set	borders,	
authority	or	international	law	that	is	agreed	upon	in	the	international	community.	The	unlimited	desire	
of	ISIS	to	expand	its	grip	on	the	region	and	exerting	worldwide	influence,	means	that	the	fighters	for	
the	caliphate	have	entered	a	death	pact	from	which	it	seems	they	are	not	planning	step	away	from.	
Even	with	declining	numbers	of	new	adherers,	severe	losses	of	territory	and	little	to	no	chance	of	a	
bright	future,	ISIS	continues	to	fight	(Roy,	2017,	3-4).	Order	in	the	international	system	since	the	peace	
of	Westphalia	is	based	on	the	mutual	recognition	of	the	sovereignty	of	states	and	their	corresponding	
borders.	Other	Muslim	organisations	in	that	region	succumbed	under	the	pressure	of	the	international	
community	via	organisations	such	as	the	UN.	The	Muslim	Brotherhood,	Hamas	and	even	the	Taliban	
are	examples	of	organisations	that	have	proved	to	be	willing	to	negotiate	with	states	and	international	
organisations.	For	ISIS,	respect	for	borders	of	sovereign	states	appears	not	to	be	an	option	given	their	
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military	 strategy	 and	 continuous	 expansionist	 urges.	 Therefore,	 ISIS	 considers	 the	 fact	 that	 these	
organisations	that	proved	to	be	willing	to	negotiate	as	acts	of	apostasy	(Wood,	2015,	18)	
The	aggressive	behaviour	of	ISIS	does	not	limit	itself	to	its	continuous	fighting	with	adversaries	
from	the	Western	opponents	but	also	includes	other	Muslims.	According	to	Roy,	ISIS	even	attacked	
the	 Palestinian	 refugee	 camp	 in	 Yarnouk	 Syria,	 certainly	 not	 an	 action	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	military	
strategy	based	on	a	clear	rationale	(2017,	10).	It	appears	that	the	offensive	strategy	of	ISIS	is	aimed	at	
everyone	 that	 does	 not	 follow	 ISIS’s	 interpretation	of	 Islam	 including	 their	 fellow	Muslims	 (Wood,	
2015,	5).	The	lack	of	willingness	of	ISIS	to	accept	other	versions	of	Islam	is	illustrated	by	their	reluctance	
to	 cooperate	 with	 other	 Muslim	 organisations.	 ISIS	 made	 clear	 that	 cooperation	 with	 similar	
organisations,	 e.g.	 Al-Qaeda	 and	 Al-Nusra,	 is	 not	 likely	 unless	 there	 would	 be	 a	 dire	 need	 for	
cooperation.	ISIS	considers	fighters	of	AL-Qaeda	as	“Jews	of	the	Jihad”,	an	insult	that	makes	clear	that	
ISIS	certainly	does	not	feel	connected	with	Al-Qaeda.	In	their	turn,	Al-Qaeda	regards	ISIS	to	be	deviant	
from	true	Islam	and	argues	that	ISIS	corrupted	Islam	(Hassan,	2016).	After	ISIS	attacked	mosques	and	
it	became	public	that	ISIS	treated	Muslims	the	same	as	infidels,	Al-Qaeda	publicly	distanced	itself	from	
the	actions	and	 ideology	of	 ISIS.	Bin	Laden	himself,	condemned	the	brutal	actions	of	 ISIS	especially	
those	directed	at	Muslims	and	the	Islamist	tribes	(McCants,	2015,	44-45).	The	relation	of	ISIS	and	tribes	
that	can	be	found	in	its	territory	is	a	complex	one	and	two-sided.	On	the	one	hand,	ISIS	has	persecuted	
the	tribal	leaders,	imprisoned,	killed	and	replaced	them	in	order	to	establish	control	over	the	territory	
and	the	people	by	all	means	necessary.	On	the	other	hand,	these	tribes	are	useful	for	ISIS	for	shelter	
and	local	governance.	It	seems	that	ISIS	has	decided	to	tolerate	some	local	tribes	but	only	as	long	as	
they	are	willing	to	comply	completely	with	ISIS’s	ideology	(Roy,	2017,	54-85).	
It	appears	to	be	strange	and	irrational	that	such	an	organisation	as	ISIS	disregards	almost	any	
chance	 of	 cooperation	 with	 other	 organisations	 or	 the	 chance	 of	 a	 peaceful	 settlement	 of	 the	
differences	with	the	West.	However,	when	assuming	that	the	rationale	of	ISIS	is	heavily	guided	by	its	
identity	of	an	apocalyptic	cult	and	its	corresponding	characteristics,	it	becomes	rational.	In	the	Hadith,	
it	is	written	that	believers	should	not	befriend	nonbelievers,	those	who	do	this	will	be	saved	(Warner,	
2010,	 4).	 The	 eschatologist	 beliefs	 of	 an	 apocalyptic	 organisation	 entail	 a	 prerogative	 for	 the	
organisation	for	who	deserves	to	be	saved	and	who	are	not	as	a	means	of	purification	of	the	world.	
This	implies	a	creation	of	a	black	and	white	world	in	which	there	are	believers	and	infidels	(Lifton,	2000,	
204).	 In	 the	 ideology	 of	 ISIS	 this	 believe	 is	 so	 strong	 that	 they	 can	 justify	 the	 killing	 and	 are	 even	
obligated	to	cleanse	the	world	of	infidels.	In	the	Hadith,	it	is	said	that	it	is	not	enough	to	adhere	to	the	
‘true	form’	of	Islam	to	be	saved,	it	is	required	to	be	actively	engaged	in	the	purification	of	the	world	of	
infidels	and	those	who	have	inflicted	harm	to	the	Muslim	community	(Roy,	2017,	52).	In	spite	of	the	
fact	that	this	harm	inflicted	on	the	Muslim	community	is	never	specified	in	the	scriptures	of	ISIS	it	is	
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used	to	 justify	and	rationalize	 its	violent	actions	against	the	“Romans”	(Roy,	2017,	47).	The	general	
command	of	purification	and	justification	of	done	harm	is	clearly	illustrated	by	the	following	citation	
from	the	Hadith	“Even	Jihad	is	inferior	unless	a	man	knowingly	risks	and	loses	both	life	and	property	
for	the	sake	of	Allah”	(Warner,	2010,	15).		
The	 features	 of	 bounded	 rationality	 that	 believers	 of	 one	 truth	 reject	 the	 possibility	 of	
alternatives	 (Selten,	 2002,	 14-16)	 lines	 up	 with	 ISIS’s	 idea	 of	 one	 absolute	 truth,	 a	 characteristic	
generally	found	in	apocalyptic	cults	(Lifton,	2000,	207).	Rejection	of	alternative	beliefs,	even	variations	
of	Islam,	or	the	willingness	to	negotiate	with	the	West	becomes	a	rational	decision	when	taking	into	
consideration	that	the	adherers	of	ISIS	are	committed	to	the	scriptures	of	the	Hadith	in	which	they	are	
obligated	 to	 actively	 engage	 in	 conflict	 with	 the	 false	 believers,	 both	 Muslim	 or	 “Romans”.	 The	
commitment	of	ISIS	Jihadi	fighters	is	so	significant	they	are	willing	to	engage	in	a	prolonged	war	even	
against	 possible	 partners	 increasing	 the	 risk	 of	 defeat.	 But	 as	 will	 be	 elaborated	 on	 in	 the	 next	
argument;	for	Jihadi	fighters,	death	does	not	mean	defeat.	
	
Disposal	of	worldly	existence	and	combat	behaviour	of	ISIS’s	combatants	
	 Combat	behaviour	of	ISIS	is	another	part	of	ISIS’s	behaviour	that	needs	further	explanation	due	
to	 the	 seemingly	 irrational	 behaviour	 that	 ISIS	 displays	 in	 those	 situations.	 Besides	 ISIS’s	 irrational	
behaviour	 regarding	 resource	 allocation	 and	 military	 strategy,	 there	 have	 been	 remarkable	
observations	of	 ISIS’s	 Jihadi	 fighters	 in	actual	combat	situations.	Every	rational	human	being	would	
dive	for	cover	when	fired	upon	by	the	enemy	in	order	to	save	his	own	life.	However,	there	has	been	
numerous	reports	of	ISIS’s	fighters	that	they	did	not	even	flinch	or	searched	for	cover	when	adversaries	
opened	fire	(Lister	et	al.,	2014).	At	first	sight,	this	might	be	simply	explained	by	the	fact	that	a	lot	of	
Jihadi	warriors	are	no	experienced	and	are	not	used	to	armed	combat	and	how	to	behave	in	such	a	
situation.	However,	this	behaviour	is	too	reoccurring	to	be	explained	without	looking	further	than	the	
overboldness	of	the	Jihadi	fighters.	As	being	said	in	the	ending	of	the	previous	section,	death	does	not	
mean	defeat	for	the	Jihadi	fighters,	it	is	even	considered	to	be	a	victory	(La	Palm,	2015,	7).	By	giving	
his	 life	 for	 the	 cause	 the	 fighter	has	made	 the	ultimate	 sacrifice	and	has	 therefore	proven	himself	
worthy	 to	be	 saved.	As	 put	 strikingly	 put	 in	 the	Hadith	 ”..the	gates	 of	 paradise	 lie	 in	 the	 shade	of	
swords”.	Although	it	should	be	mentioned	that	the	entrance	to	paradise	can	be	achieved	by	less	than	
sacrificing	one’s	life,	fighting	is	encouraged	in	the	scriptures	as	the	quickest	way	to	salvation	(Warner,	
2010,	15).	
	 This	rationale	provided	by	the	ideology	of	ISIS	can	be	used	to	explain	the	willingness	of	Jihadi	
fighters	to	engage	in	suicide	attacks	as	well.	According	to	the	Hadith,	suicide	is	seen	as	a	sin	in	Islam,	
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but	killing	yourself	or	getting	killed	during	an	act	of	Jihadism	is	not	a	sin	but	is	seen	as	the	highest	form	
of	 Islam	 (Warner,	 2010,	 17).	 Suicide	 attacks	 are	 therefore	 perceived	 as	 the	 ultimate	 form	of	 their	
commitment	to	the	cause	of	ISIS	(Roy,	2017,	2	&	5).	As	can	be	seen	in	the	behaviour	of	earlier	militant	
groups	such	as	the	Red	Brigades,	such	fighters	do	not	fear	death	of	prosecution	if	their	sacrifice	is	not	
in	 vain	 (2017,	 99).	 From	 the	 recent	 terrorist	 attacks	performed	by	 adherers	of	 ISIS	directed	at	 the	
Western	civilian	population,	e.g.	the	Bataclan,	almost	all	resulted	in	the	death	the	of	the	perpetrators	
due	the	suicidal	nature	of	the	attacks	or	by	being	killed.	It	appeared	that	perpetrators	of	these	terrorist	
attacks	did	not	had	the	intention	to	escape	after	they	committed	these	acts.	The	willingness	of	militant	
radicals	to	die	 is	not	a	new	phenomenon	that	appeared	with	the	establishment	of	 ISIS.	However,	 it	
appears	that	the	fighters	of	ISIS	do	not	regard	death	as	a	necessary	evil	but	are	actually	eager	to	be	
slain	in	combat	(Roy,	2017,	2-4)	
	 Disposal	of	worldly	existence	can	be	found	an	explanation	for	the	brutal	executions	of	captured	
personnel	from	the	adversaries	of	ISIS	as	well.	As	being	said,	ISIS	does	not	respect	international	laws	
including	that	prisoners	of	war	that	should	be	treated	with	dignity	and	respect	during	armed	conflict	
given	the	fact	that	these	prisoners	no	longer	pose	a	threat	to	the	opponent	(Heywood,	2007,	256).	
Instead	of	detaining	 its	prisoners,	 ISIS	has	brutally	executed	a	 large	number	of	 its	prisoners	on	 live	
broadcasts	for	the	whole	world	to	see.	These	executions	are	rehearsed	numerous	times	in	order	to	
perfectionate	 the	 theatrical	 performance	 on	 an	 almost	 professional	 level	 (Roy,	 2017,	 50).	 A	 prime	
example	of	such	a	professionalized	display	of	violence	is	the	execution	of	the	Jordan	fighter	pilot	by	
burning	him	to	death	in	front	of	an	entire	crowd	while	being	filmed	with	several	cameras	(Su,	2015).	
These	 acts	 could	 be	 explained	 as	 an	 illustration	 of	 ISIS	 commitment	 to	 the	 cause	 or	 as	 symbolic.	
However,	in	the	Hadith	it	is	written	that	killing	infidels	is	one	of	the	ways	a	Muslim	can	achieve	salvation	
(Warner,	2010,	8).	Furthermore,	ISIS	did	not	commit	these	acts	in	order	to	scare	their	adversaries	so	
that	they	would	refrain	from	combat;	ISIS	is	not	willing	to	negotiate	or	negotiate	with	infidels	in	any	
way	(Roy,	2017,	3).	Furthermore,	this	display	of	ISIS’s	ways	of	dealing	with	prisoners	of	war	did	not	
achieve	anything	besides	Jordan	intensifying	its	fight	against	ISIS.	Apart	from	the	previously	discussed	
argument	that	war	is	not	a	means	but	an	end	to	ISIS,	executions	such	as	that	of	the	Jordan	fighter	pilot	
can	be	rationally	explained	for	ISIS	from	another	incentive	for	the	organisation	as	well.	The	disposal	of	
worldly	existence	includes	the	altruistic	murder	of	those	who	do	not	believe.	By	killing	those	who	do	
not	believe	in	ISIS’s	true	form	of	Islam,	Jihadi	fighters	cleanse	the	world	of	these	people	and	at	the	
same	time	improving	the	prospects	of	salvation	for	both	the	fighter	and	the	people	slain	in	the	violent	
act.	Thus,	for	the	adherers	these	actions	are	seen	as	a	type	of	altruistic	murder	from	which	both	the	
believer	and	the	infidels	benefit	(Lifton,	2002,	204).	
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ISIS’s	totalitarian	control	and	its	human	resource	management	
	 Apart	from	the	aggressive	ideology	of	ISIS	aimed	at	everyone	that	does	not	adapt	ISIS’s	views,	
ISIS’s	ideology	is	also	directed	towards	its	own	members	(La	Palm,	2014,	2).	A	chilling	example	of	the	
internal	totalitarian	control	of	ISIS	regarding	the	people	living	in	the	caliphate	is	the	crucifixion	of	the	
17-year-old	 Abdullah	 Bushi.	 In	 October	 2014,	 the	 youngster	 was	 accused	 of	 filming	 one	 of	 the	
headquarters	of	ISIS	on	the	countryside	of	Aleppo.	His	body	was	left	at	the	site	for	everyone	to	see	
with	a	written	warning	for	others	not	to	disrespect	the	set	rules	endangering	the	purity	of	the	caliphate	
(Manoum,	2014).	 In	order	to	coerce	the	 inhabitants	of	 the	caliphate	to	act	according	the	set	rules,	
special	police	forces	are	installed.	These	set	rules	entail	the	enforcement	daily	prayers,	banning	drugs,	
tobacco,	alcohol,	non-Islamic	music	and	gambling,	regulations	for	clothing	and	destruction	of	religious	
shrines	(Lister,	2014,	26).	This	religious	police	travels	around	confronting	people	they	come	across	with	
their	sins.	This	includes	the	restrictions	mentioned	above	but	also	women	wearing	see-through	veils	
or	 stores	 selling	water	during	Ramadan.	Any	offences	are	publicly	punished	 in	accordance	 to	 ISIS’s	
laws.	These	punishments	consist	of	whipping,	stoning,	hanging	and	beheadings	(La	Palm,	2014,	6	&	
Warner,	2010,	6).	The	public	and	gruesome	nature	of	the	punishment	together	with	the	fact	that	they	
are	often	filmed	and	broadcasted	creates	an	atmosphere	of	fear	among	those	living	in	the	caliphate.	
There	are	numerous	reports	of	people	trying	to	escape	the	caliphate	due	to	the	extreme	punishments	
fearing	that	they	might	be	next.	These	broadcasted	punishments	also	create	a	threshold	for	those	who	
might	 join	 ISIS	(Abdul-Zahra,	2016).	Furthermore,	the	vast	territory	of	the	caliphate	requires	 ISIS	to	
constantly	recruit	new	members	for	their	cause.	However,	since	2015	the	number	of	foreign	fighters	
traveling	 to	 the	caliphate	has	been	diminishing	at	a	steady	rate.	Together	with	significant	 losses	of	
territory	 and	 income	 from	 oil	 ISIS	 has	 suffered,	 it	 is	 not	 rational	 to	 heavily	 punish	 those	who	 are	
supporting	 ISIS	 and	 causing	 adherers	 trying	 to	 leave	 the	 organisation.	 Especially	 when	 these	
punishments	are	inflicted	for	minor	offenses	that	could	be	punished	in	a	way	that	creates	less	aversion	
among	adherers	and	potential	new	adherers	(Gartenstein-Ross,	2015).		
New	affiliates	 that	 have	 chosen	 to	 travel	 to	 the	 caliphate	 are	 not	 send	off	 to	 fight	 for	 the	
caliphate	within	a	considerable	amount	of	time.	Upon	arrival,	new	recruits	have	to	pass	a	series	of	
interviews	 in	 which	 personal	 information	 is	 documented	 together	 with	 copies	 of	 passports	 and	
personal	 files.	 After	 these	 interviews,	 new	 recruits	 have	 to	 undergo	 several	 weeks	 of	 extensive	
religious	training	(Lister,	2014,	17-18).	The	religious	training	is	aimed	at	teaching	new	recruits	the	true	
form	of	Islam	and	looking	for	indications	that	new	recruits	might	be	spies	for	the	“Romans”	(Abdul-
Zahra,	2016).	The	military	training	is	focussed	on	the	use	of	pistols,	assault	rifles	and	sometimes	other	
heavy	weaponry.	Upon	completion	of	 the	 training,	new	 recruits	are	assigned	 to	guard	duty	before	
being	trusted	enough	to	be	send	off	for	frontline	military	operations	(Lister,	2014,	17-18).	The	strict	
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control	of	the	fighters	and	the	elaborate	training	and	documentation	of	new	recruits	appears	to	be	
very	time-consuming	and	a	threshold	for	potential	new	fighters.	Furthermore,	the	harsh	punishments	
and	strict	control	on	the	population	of	the	caliphate	seem	to	require	significant	time	and	effort	as	well.	
With	the	diminishing	numbers	of	ISIS	is	would	appear	to	be	sensible	to	send	new	recruits	as	soon	as	
possible	to	the	frontline	and	cherish	those	inside	the	caliphate.	However,	when	looking	at	underlying	
motivations	for	ISIS	to	exert	this	kind	of	strict	control	it	becomes	rational	for	the	organisation.	
Strict	totalitarian	internal	control	of	adherers	is	common	among	apocalyptic	cults.	In	order	to	
achieve	 salvation,	 the	adherers	of	 the	organisation	 should	be	 completely	pure	and	devoted	 to	 the	
cause	(La	Palm,	2014,	2).	Any	behaviour	that	 is	not	 in	 line	with	the	 ideology	of	the	apocalyptic	cult	
causes	it	to	be	corrupted	endangering	the	salvation	of	the	rest.	For	radicals	all	ideological,	religious	or	
political	movements	that	came	before	them	are	rejected.	Connection	of	adherers	with	these	rejected	
ideas	form	liabilities	 for	the	pureness	of	the	organisation.	Therefore,	communication	of	adherers	 is	
strictly	 monitored	 in	 order	 that	 will	 not	 diverge	 from	 the	 path	 of	 ISIS.	 By	 strictly	 controlling	
communication	 of	 those	 adhering	 ISIS,	 chances	 of	 them	 finding	 a	 different	 rationale	 among	 the	
available	alternatives	 in	 the	 forms	of	 science,	 religion	and	 ideology,	are	 limited	 (La	Palm,	2014,	2).	
Commitment	to	purity	seems	to	be	rational	and	not	to	differ	from	the	procedures	of	a	regular	army.	
However,	the	commitment	to	this	purity	is	so	strong	among	the	ranks	of	ISIS	that	they	are	willing	to	
purge	 among	 their	 own	members	 and	 discourage	 potential	members	 from	 joining.	 This	 seemingly	
irrational	behaviour	becomes	rationalized	when	taking	into	account	the	fact	that	the	ideology	of	ISIS	
prescribes	internal	purity	as	one	of	the	perquisites	to	be	saved	(Lifton,	2000,	206).	
	
Conclusion	
	 The	vast	territory	of	the	caliphate,	the	significant	number	of	foreign	fighters	willing	to	fight	for	
ISIS,	its	disruptive	role	in	the	region	and	the	numerous	attacks	on	Western	citizens	made	the	proto-
state	of	ISIS	significantly	more	influential	than	previous	Jihadi	organisations.	The	unique	subject	of	ISIS,	
especially	due	to	its	extraordinary	aggressive	behaviour	that	seems	to	be	irrational,	has	proven	to	a	
complex	actor	that	should	be	examined	in	closer	detail.	This	concluding	section	will	briefly	discuss	the	
various	arguments	and	points	made	in	this	thesis	to	come	to	a	conclusion	regarding	the	formulated	
research	 question:	 “To	 which	 extent	 can	 bounded	 rationality,	 entailed	 by	 the	 narrative	 of	 an	
apocalyptic	cult,	be	used	to	explain	the	irrational	actions	of	ISIS?”		
In	contemporary	literature	ISIS	is	often	considered	as	a	terrorist	organisation	that	acts	on	the	
basis	 of	 rational	 assumptions.	 However,	 after	 researching	 the	 behaviour	 and	 the	 used	 ideological	
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scriptures	of	ISIS	it	became	clear	that	there	are	aspects	of	ISIS’s	behaviour	that	cannot	be	explained	
when	regarding	ISIS	as	such.	In	this	thesis,	the	theory	of	bounded	rationality	is	used	to	formulate	an	
additional	 rationale	 for	 the	 seemingly	 irrational	 behaviour	 of	 ISIS	 by	 taking	 into	 account	 its	
eschatologist	 ideology.	 The	 goal	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 not	 to	 debunk	 the	 notion	 that	 ISIS	 is	 a	 terrorist	
organisation	but	rather	to	provide	a	rational	explanation	for	aspects	that	are	difficult	to	explain	when	
considering	it	merely	as	a	terrorist	organisation.	
	 As	an	addition	to	the	commonly	used	explanation	of	terrorism	for	ISIS,	this	thesis	highlighted	
the	 importance	of	 taking	 into	consideration	underlying	motivations	and	 incentives	provided	by	 the	
ideology	of	the	organisation.	The	analysis	 in	this	thesis	was	constructed	out	of	four	arguments	that	
address	different	sections	of	the	behaviour	of	ISIS.	These	four	arguments	were	operationalized	via	the	
domains	of	resource	allocation,	military	strategy,	combat	behaviour	and	management	of	membership.	
By	 exploring	 the	 behaviour	 of	 ISIS	 by	 the	 four	 domains	 rational	 explanations	 could	 be	 found	 in	
behaviour	that	prior	seemed	to	be	 irrational.	 ISIS’s	eschatologist	view	of	a	final	battle	between	the	
true	Muslims	and	the	army	of	“Romans”	explains	their	commitment	to	continue	their	fight	against	the	
West	 even	when	 jeopardizing	 the	 established	 caliphate.	 The	 eschatologist	 idea	 and	 that	 it	 is	 their	
objective	 to	purge	 the	earth	 from	 infidels,	motivates	 ISIS	 to	 invest	 a	 great	 amount	of	 resources	 in	
fighting	instead	of	maintaining	its	caliphate.	When	a	Jihadi	fighter	sacrifices	his	life	during	this	fight	he	
will	receive	salvation;	death	does	not	mean	defeat,	it	is	considered	a	victory.	This	provides	a	rational	
explanation	for	reported	Jihadi	fighters	that	do	not	duck	for	cover	in	combat	situations;	due	to	their	
beliefs	death	is	not	something	they	fear.	Furthermore,	all	enemies	of	the	caliphate	that	are	slain	are	
released	from	their	life	of	sinners,	justifying	and	encouraging	the	use	of	violence	for	ISIS.	In	order	for	
those	living	in	the	caliphate	to	be	saved,	it	is	important	to	keep	the	organisation	as	pure	as	possible.	
Therefore,	ISIS	invests	a	significant	amount	of	time	and	energy	to	keep	the	inhabitants	of	the	caliphate	
and	new	recruits	as	pure	as	possible.	This	is	done	by	harsh	punishments	when	laws	are	violated	and	
extensive	training	and	strict	monitoring	of	new	fighters.	
	 Based	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 ISIS’s	 seemingly	 irrational	 behaviour,	 this	 thesis	 has	 made	 a	
contribution	 to	 the	 field	 of	 behaviour	 of	 terrorist	 organisations,	 apocalyptic	 cults	 and	 rationalizing	
religiously	motivated	violence.	With	the	use	of	the	theory	of	bounded	rationality	and	the	narrative	of	
an	apocalyptic	cult,	this	thesis	has	been	able	to	provide	rational	explanations	for	various	actions	of	ISIS	
that	prior	seemed	 irrational.	However,	 it	should	be	kept	 in	mind	that	the	 limited	access	to	primary	
sources	might	have	led	to	conclusions	that	later	might	prove	to	be	unjust.	Furthermore,	in	this	thesis	
a	clear	distinction	between	the	motivations	of	the	ranks	of	ISIS	has	not	been	made.	It	might	be	possible	
that	higher	ranks	of	the	organisation	use	the	forthcoming	apocalypse	as	a	means	to	attract	new	recruits	
and	that	all	acts	regarding	this	apocalypse	are	merely	symbolic.	This	could	be	interesting	to	research	
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to	 a	 further	 extent.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 further	 develop	 the	 research	 on	 the	 militant	
organisation	of	ISIS	to	investigate	if	the	explanation	of	an	apocalyptic	cult	is	indeed	a	viable	explanation	
for	its	seemingly	irrational	behaviour.	
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